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Bryan F. Mansfield and Keith F. Snider
Introduction
Performance-based acquisition (PBA; see, for example, Maddox et al. 2014) has
been an important element of U.S. federal public procurement policy for over thirty
years. The underlying rationale of PBA is that the government should not tell
contractors how to perform, because doing so would stifle industry’s creativity.
Instead, the government should define its requirements in terms of the outcomes
contractors must achieve without specifying the “how to” details. Such an approach,
its proponents argue, improves competition and empowers industry to innovate and
accomplish desired objectives more efficiently. Further, greater reliance on perfor-
mance specifications in contracts should allow for reductions in government contract
oversight processes and personnel, with concomitant cost and schedule savings.
(Wehrle-Einhorn 1993, p. 10). Over the years, procurement policy-makers have
pursued PBA’s benefits through progressively prescriptive measures, ranging from
(1) initial policy preferences for PBA in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to
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(2) statutory preferences with mandatory reporting requirements and implementation
goals to (3) high-level approvals for certain types of contracts not classified as PBA
(Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2002).
At first glance, data suggest that this policy push had its desired effect. For
example, in 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD; the US government’s largest
agency) reported using PBA techniques for 29% of total obligations for services
contracts; in 2014, this had increased to 57% (Avramidis 2012). In practice,
however, PBA’s promise has sometimes gone unrealized. In 2002, the GAO found
that several agencies that claimed to have applied PBA did not actually do so. Over
half of the sampled contracts that were reported as PBA did not actually meet PBA
criteria (GAO 2002, p. 2).
Of course, such “policy without practice” (GAO 2008; Rendon 2013) appears not
only in the realm of federal contracting but rather wherever policy-makers’ inten-
tions fail to materialize in action. The policy sciences literature on implementation
(see, for example, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) calls attention to unwarranted
assumptions that policy-making entities and policy-implementing agencies share
common interests and have similar motivations. Institutional theory (Meyer and
Rowan 1977) focuses on an organization’s concerns with accommodating and
responding to its external influences, such as competition with other organizations
for political power and legitimacy, as well as for resources and customers (Kanter
1972; Aldrich 1979). Thus, an expectation that a policy pronouncement will lead to
implementation with the desired policy outcome fails to account for differences in
the institutional influences on policy-makers and policy-implementers and, more
importantly, differences in the organizational responses of each to those influences.
Purpose and Method
In this paper, using PBA as a vehicle, we explore the policy-practice gap from the
perspective of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), which
describes how an organization comes to resemble others under the influence of
various external environmental forces. Rather than organizational form, however,
our focus is on organizational actions or behaviors; thus we use here the term
institutional isopraxism. Specifically, we describe policy-making entities as
exhibiting mimetic isopraxism in their preferences for certain private sector prac-
tices and their desires to transfer those practices to government operations.
Policy-makers may also employ coercive isopraxism to force subordinate imple-
menting agencies to adopt those practices.
Institutional isopraxism provides a means to illuminate the origins of the
policy-practice gap. Specifically, the very different sets of influences acting upon
policy-making and policy-implementing organizations lead to different but rational
and predictable organizational responses to those influences. We see this perspec-
tive as enriching the theoretical understanding of the policy process (Kingdon 1984;
Stone 1988). Further, heightened awareness of and appreciation for the differences
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in external influences on policy-making entities and implementing agencies may
give each a better understanding of the other’s actions and help lessen the distance
between policy and practice.
The paper begins with a background description of PBA policy and its evolution
within US federal contracting. It then presents an analysis of a sample of US Navy
service contracts to illustrate the gap between PBA policy and PBA practice. This
leads to the central arguments of the paper which explain the policy-practice gap
from the perspective of institutional isopraxism, as well as some of the unintended
consequences and deleterious effects of the gap. The paper concludes by describing
a policy approach that acknowledges institutional influences and may help narrow
the gap.
Background of PBA
The underlying rationale of PBA is that by describing the work in clear, specific,
and objective terms with measureable outcomes, the government can focus a
contractor’s attention on desired outcomes rather than “how to” details (which are
presumably not important). This approach, its proponents argue, unleashes private
industry’s creativity, resulting in both higher quality performance and cost savings.
Other purported benefits include maximizing competition, promoting the use of
commercial services, and shifting risk from government to industry (DOD 2012,
pp. 8–9). In theory, the government can establish the performance outcomes, then
step away and let the contractor perform. This rationale relies on the assumption
that the requirement can be defined in terms of clear, specific, and objective terms
with measureable outcomes.
While Edwards and Nash (2007, p. 354) note several attempts to use PBA prior
to 1980, the first US federal PBA policy statement was issued by the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) with OFPP Pamphlet Number 4 titled, “A
Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements of Work for Service
Contracts” (Avramidis 2012, pp. 7–8).
In the early 1990s, PBA gained momentum from several important initiatives.
First, Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) influential book titled, Reinventing
Government, promoted the view of government as focused on “steering rather than
rowing”; that is, focused on policy outcomes rather than execution details. Second,
the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review (later the National
Partnership for Reinventing Government) advocated an orientation of government
toward results and outcomes rather than on “red tape” details (Gore 1993). Third,
Secretary of Defense William Perry’s initiative to move away from military-unique
specifications and standards led to an emphasis on performance-based and com-
mercial standards in contracting (Fox et al. 2012). Finally, the general trend toward
privatization, outsourcing, and the decline in the federal workforce (Nagle 1999;
Abramson and Harris 2003; Gansler 2011) appeared to validate then-President
Clinton’s (1996) declaration that “the era of big government is over.” Under such
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constraints, government could manage outcomes but not details. Outsourcing the
provision of government services so that there is less government influence on and
interference with normal business activity is one political strategy. Such a strategy
reduces the size of the government workforce under the philosophy that less
government is better government (Pegnato 2003).
Under such conditions, the PBA concept grew from a policy preference in 1991
to a statutory preference carrying mandatory reporting requirements and imple-
mentation goals. Several agencies created guidebooks on using PBA, including
OFPP, DOD, and an Interagency-Industry Partnership (Avramidis 2012, p. 9).
Origins of the PBA Policy-Practice Gap
The popularity of PBA is reflected in the growth of DOD’s PBA implementation
goals. In 2001, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) created a goal of
using PBA for 20% of total eligible services dollars obligated. OMB raised this goal
to 40% in 2004, to 45% in 2006, then ultimately to 50% in 2008 (Avramidis 2012,
pp. 59–61).
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required higher
level approvals of contracts that were not performance-based. This rule was
implemented in DOD as an interim rule in the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS),1,2 and although Congress later abandoned the
higher level approval requirement in favor or more general urgings to use PBA to
the maximum extent practicable, the requirement was never removed. As imple-
mented in the Navy,3 a contracting officer faced with a complex services require-
ment would have needed the approval of an official at least two levels higher in the
chain of command before awarding a contract that did not use PBA techniques.
The PBA policy initiative, including the implementation goals, certainly had an
impact. Contracts identified as having used PBA techniques increased substantially
from fiscal year 2005 to 2014. In 2005, DOD reported using PBA techniques for
29% of total obligations for services; in 2014, this had increased to 57%.4
1In this paper, all references to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and the Navy and Marine Corps Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) are available at http://farsite.hill.af.mil.
2See DFARS 237.170-2(a) and DFARS 237.170-3(a). This requirement was later consolidated into
DFARS 237.170-2(a).
3DFARS 237.170-2(a) provides flexibility to the agency to determine the specific approving
official. Prior to 19 March 2015, the Navy had assigned the Head of the Contracting Agency or the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Procurement as the approving official,
depending on the dollar value of the contract (NMCARS 5237.170-2(a) through Change 13-04).
Per NMCARS 5237.170-2(a)(S-90), only architect-engineer (A&E) services and personal medical
services were exempt from the approval requirements.
4According to data from the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG),
available at https://www.fpds.gov/.
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However, as noted in a 2002 GAO report entitled, “Guidance Needed for Using
Performance-Based Service Contracting,” several agencies that claimed to have
applied PBA did not actually do so. Over half of the contracts sampled by GAO (16
of 25) did not actually meet the minimum criteria for PBA (2002, p. 2); this
indicates a gap between what policy-makers intended and what contracting agen-
cies did in actual practice.
The Policy-Practice Gap: Level-of-Effort Services Contracts
To investigate the PBA policy-practice gap further, an exploratory analysis of a
sample of US Navy contracts was conducted to investigate whether contracts that
are designated as PBA reflect a proper application of PBA criteria. The sample
focused on level of effort (LOE) contracts, a category of services acquisitions which
is inconsistent with PBA’s rationale. Thus, if a significant proportion of contracts
designated as PBA is found to be LOE, the analysis helps confirm the existence of a
PBA policy-practice gap.
Generally, services contracts define the contractor’s obligation in one of two
ways: by describing the required work, either in terms of the completion of one or
more specified tasks, or by describing the required amount of effort (LOE, typically
measured in labor hours) that the contractor must expend in performing one or more
specified tasks (Cibinic et al. 2011, p. 1317). In US federal contracting, there is a
regulatory preference to use the completion type, because it contractually obligates
the contractor to produce an end product or result. However, regulations recognize
that not all requirements can state a definite goal or target, or specify an end result,
which is why LOE contracts exist. LOE includes time-and-materials (T&M) con-
tracts, labor-hour (LH) contracts, cost-reimbursement term contracts, and
firm-fixed-price LOE term contracts (FFP-LOE) (Cibinic et al. 2011, p. 1318).
PBA and LOE approaches are fundamentally incompatible: If one cannot define
the work in terms of a definite goal, target, or end product—thus suggesting the use
of an LOE contract type—one cannot establish meaningful performance outcomes
as required under PBA. Therefore, a requirement that meets the conditions for LOE
does not meet the conditions for PBA, and a requirement that meets the conditions
for PBA does not meet the conditions for LOE. This incompatibility is reinforced in
US federal acquisition policy [see, for example, OUSD(AT&L) 2014, p. 2; FAR
37.602(b)(1)].
This analysis examined a sample of Navy services contracts that were identified
as performance-based, determined whether these contracts were completion or
LOE, and then evaluated the LOE contracts more closely to determine whether
PBA was applied according to US federal standards. Observations were also made
regarding the supposed performance results, acceptable quality levels, and planned
methods for evaluating performance.
The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) provided a list of all contracts
with relevant characteristics (e.g., categorized as PBA; awarded by Navy sources)
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from a 12-month timeframe (1 March 2014–1 March 2015); this population totaled
4785 contracts. A sample size of 50 was judged to provide a sufficiently large
number to establish trends; statistical significance was not pursued. The 50 con-
tracts for detailed examination were selected randomly from the total population.
As a first step, each contract in the sample was evaluated to determine whether it
should be categorized as LOE or completion. Of the 50 contracts in the sample, 22
were identified as LOE, and 9 contracts were identified as completion. For a variety
of reasons (e.g., inadequate documentation), the remaining 19 contracts could not
be classified as either completion or LOE. Because this analysis focused on LOE
contracts, contracts that were identified as completion or that could not be classified
were not further analyzed.
The 22 LOE contracts were then evaluated according to four criteria listed in the
FAR and the DOD Guidebook for the Acquisition of Services to determine whether
PBA was applied correctly. Additionally, observations were made regarding the
performance results, acceptable quality levels, and planned methods for evaluating
performance; these suggested several trends which are discussed further below. The
four criteria and the results of the evaluation are given in Table 9.1.
Based on the standards listed in the FAR and the DOD Guidebook for the
Acquisition of Services, all minimum criteria must be met for a contract to be
defined as PBA. Thus, if each of the criteria is met, PBA was properly applied; if at
least one criterion is not met, PBA was not properly applied.
The evaluation above indicates that not a single LOE contract from the sample
met all the minimum criteria for the proper use of PBA. Although some contracts
included measureable, objective methods of evaluating performance, these methods
were not tied to performance results. Notably, not a single LOE contract specified a
performance result instead of a number of hours to be provided. The implication is
ironic: The Navy could not properly apply PBA techniques to LOE contracts, yet it
labeled LOE contracts as PBA. How can this be explained?
Incentives for Labeling LOE Contracts as PBA
Agencies, including the Navy, seem compelled to identify contracts as PBA
whether or not this approach is proper. What incentives does the PBA policy
initiative give to contracting activities? Aside from the preferential treatment given
to PBA in the regulations, the PBA policy initiative motivated the contracting
community to adopt PBA techniques in two key ways: (1) goals and reporting, and
(2) required waivers for non-PBA contracts. Taken together, these strongly
incentivize contracting commands to identify contracts as PBA, regardless of
whether a PBA approach is used.
Some exemptions from PBA reporting are provided for certain types of services
contracts (OUSD(AT&L) 2006); however, these exemptions do not include many
types of services where PBA is not appropriate. Edwards and Nash, for example,
argue that PBA is not practical for long-term and complex services (2007, p. 355),
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which may be appropriate for the LOE approach, yet the reporting exemptions do
not completely cover long-term and complex services. Because LOE services
contracts are not exempted from PBA reporting, activities have an incentive to
identify them as PBA in order to meet PBA goals.
The second motivation, requiring higher level approvals for non-PBA contracts,
may have also contributed to the misapplication of PBA. As noted earlier, The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required higher level
approvals of contracts that were not performance-based. In the US Navy, a con-
tracting officer faced with a complex services requirement would have needed the
approval of an official at least two levels higher in the chain-of-command before
awarding a contract that did not use PBA techniques. Contracting officers were
faced with a dilemma—either attempt to mask services requirements as PBA and
report them as such, or submit a waiver to the approving official for every complex
services contract. As demonstrated by the data, many contracting officers appear to
have chosen to either misapply PBA or misidentify contracts as PBA.
Negative Effects of Applying PBA to LOE Contracts
This issue entails consequences more serious than a simple mislabeling. First, the
examination of the sample of 50 contracts revealed that applying PBA to LOE
contracts resulted in useless and distracting performance incentives. For example,
Table 9.1 Evaluation of level-of effort contracts labeled as PBA
Criterion Evaluation result
The contract’s performance work statement
(PWS) describes a required result rather than
either “how” the work is to be accomplished
or the number of hours to be provided [FAR
37.602(b)(1)]
Of the 22 LOE contracts, 21 did not specify a
performance result. All 22 specified a
required number of hours to be provided
The contract includes measureable
performance standards [FAR 37.601(b) (2)]
15 contracts did not include measurable
performance standards. In 5 contracts, it
could not be determined whether measureable
performance standards were given
The contract includes a method for assessing
performance against performance standards
(FAR 37.601(b)(2))
1 contract did not include a method by which
to measure performance against the
standards. For 19 of the contracts, it was not
clear whether this criterion was met; this was
mainly due to inaccessibility of the Quality
Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) for
these contracts
The contractor’s performance against the
required standards is measureable through an
objective process (DOD 2012, p. 9)
1 contract did provide an objective process by
which to measure performance. As with
criterion 3 above, for 19 of the contracts, it
was not clear whether this criterion was met,
due to inaccessibility of the QASP
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several sampled contracts contained a performance standard similar to the fol-
lowing: “100% of reports are timely, accurate, and complete.” This standard should
be obvious to any services contractor; it is hard to imagine a contractor altering its
performance based on this standard. Other standards focused the contractor’s
attention on trivial elements of the overall performance, which may have distracted
the contractor’s attention away from important elements. For example, several
contracts focused on grammatical correctness of reports. Describing a complex
services requirement in terms of the number of grammatical errors ignores the
inherent subjectivity in evaluating complex performance outcomes. Therefore, a
contractor providing these services may have been incentivized to provide gram-
matically correct reports (which can be objectively measured), rather than, for
example, an innovative solution to a complex engineering problem (which can only
be subjectively measured). Employing such useless and meaningless objectives
may distract attention away from truly important mission-focused standards, thus
potentially risking harm to the government’s objective.
Second, forcing the PBA approach on a complex services requirement requires
substantial effort during both the procurement and administration phases. Because
requirements that fit the LOE contract type do not have clear, specific, and objective
terms with measureable outcomes, attempting to define such requirements in PBA
terms has the potential to consume valuable time and create tension between the
contracting officer and requirements personnel. The time and effort spent forcing the
PBA approach on LOE services prior to contract award represents a cost to the
government. Furthermore, the standards and acceptable quality levels, although
meaningless or distracting, must be considered by the contractor in developing the
proposal. This time and effort wasted prior to award represents a cost to industry.
During the administration phase, the contractor must perform to the required
standards and acceptable quality levels, and the government must monitor this
performance in accordance with the QASP. One sampled contract required that
technical reports contain grammatical errors in no more than 2% of the lines. In this
case, the contractor must review every line of these reports prior to submission to
ensure that they contain no grammatical errors. Upon receipt of the reports, the
government must also review every line, count the grammatical errors, and then
record the number of reports meeting this acceptable quality level. Clearly, focusing
on grammatical correctness not only distracts from truly important requirements; it
also wastes time and effort.
Earlier we noted that the growth in PBA goals was accompanied by a growth in
PBA obligations. This suggests that the PBA policy push was strong, and that the
acquisition community responded to this pressure. However, the results reported
above support the conclusion, shared by the GAO (2002), that this growth has been
achieved, at least in part, with pseudo-PBA contracts; obviously, this was not what
PBA policy-makers had in mind.
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Insights from Institutional Theory
Institutional theory offers a conceptual grounding to make sense of this narrative of
the PBA policy-practice gap. Specifically, the ideas of institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983) highlight environmental influences that cause orga-
nizations to take on similar forms. Rather than form, however, we are concerned in
this analysis of policy and practice with action, and so we use institutional iso-
praxism to highlight influences that drive organizations to act similarly.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, pp. 150–154) propose three types of isomorphism
—coercive, mimetic, and normative. The following discussion adapts their
descriptions of these isomorphisms to develop the parallels in isopraxism:
• Coercive isopraxism occurs when an organization receives pressure (formal or
informal) from another organization on which it depends, as in governmental or
corporate hierarchical relationships. The dependent organization is pressured to
take actions espoused or prescribed by the higher-level entity, as in the case of
policy-makers directing the actions of implementing agencies.
• Mimetic isopraxism occurs in environments of uncertainty when, in order to
resolve ambiguity about what to do next, organizations take actions that model
those of other organizations—particularly other organizations that are perceived
to be successful or legitimate.
• Normative isopraxism occurs mainly through professionalization. Organizations
tend to act in increasingly similar ways as their members share common edu-
cational, occupational, and professional needs and experiences.
Regarding the PBA policy-practice gap, Fig. 9.1 provides a conceptual mapping
of these isopraxisms in terms of various environmental influences that have been
discussed earlier in this paper.
Mimetic isopraxism occurred when, amid calls for acquisition reform throughout
the 1980s and ‘90s, policy-makers saw the PBA practices of the private sector as
more efficient and effective—thus institutionally more legitimate—than the public
Fig. 9.1 PBA institutional isopraxisms
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sector. The private sector’s influence on policy-making entities was subsequently
reflected in laws and regulations that promoted business-like, outcomes-based
approaches in government, even to the extent of preferring private sector solutions
through increased out-sourcing and privatization.
We see this mimetic influence as having been sufficiently strong that
policy-makers pushed the adoption of PBA without first understanding some key
implementation details—for example, the use of PBA in different types of contracts.
Thus, PBA policy consistently lacked the nuances of practice that would enable
effective implementation. DiMaggio and Powell note two aspects of politically
constructed environments such as that in which PBA policy was made: “[P]olitical
decisionmakers often do not experience directly the consequences of their actions;
and political decisions are applied across the board to entire classes of organiza-
tions, thus making such decisions less adaptive and less flexible” (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983, p. 150).
Early (roughly 1980s) PBA policy simply reflected a preference for PBA and
thus had little coercive influence. We interpret this restraint as policy-makers’ early
intent that procurement agencies would similarly recognize the benefits of PBA and
adopt—mimetically—the PBA best practices of their private sector counterparts.
Normative influences might grow in the forms of such as training and educational
programs in PBA. However, several years passed with no apparent widespread
adoption of PBA, which suggests that agencies were not significantly influenced by
private sector practices.
As perceptions of acquisition’s problems continued, policy-makers began taking
more directive and prescriptive approaches to pressure agencies to implement PBA,
such as establishing goals, reporting requirements, and high-level approvals for
non-PBA contracts. This resulted in coercive isopraxism with agencies aligning
their actions to accommodate higher level pressures from the entities that control
their resources and define their missions. Ironically, as Fig. 9.1 indicates, this
coercive isopraxism apparently outweighed any significant mimetic and normative
influences from the private sector, which over the longer term might have informed
a more appropriate and effective PBA practice. (The dashed outline of the mimetic
and normative influences indicates their weak or non-existent effect on agencies.)
Under this coercive policy influence, the message to implementing agencies was
clear: Use PBA, or pay the costs of added effort. More precisely, the operative
pressure on agencies was to label actions as PBA whether they were suitable or not.
Under these circumstances, the motivations and incentives of the actors were clear,
and the reactions were predictable. Braithwaite (2008) uses the term regulatory
ritualism for the “tendency toward compliance in terms of data collection and
reporting but where the regulatory impact on behaviors and outcomes is less clear”
(Jarvis 2014, p. 249). Agencies displayed ritualistic compliance with policy by
labelling non-PBA contracts as PBA.
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Figure 9.2 illustrates details of this policy practice gap in a 2  2 matrix with
the variables suitability and application on the two axes. Policy makers are con-
cerned with the application of PBA: If PBA is not applied to contracts, the benefits
of PBA cannot be realized. In the practice of acquisition, however, agency con-
tracting officers are concerned with details of individual contracts and whether a
particular contract is suitable for PBA application. Ideally, of course, all contracts
would fall in quadrants I and III; all suitable contracts and no unsuitable contracts
would apply PBA. Past PBA policy, however, had the effect of pushing agencies to
apply PBA to all contracts regardless of suitability, and thus toward Quadrant II—
the realm of the policy-practice gap. By implication, increasingly coercive policies
will only widen the gap.
Quadrant IV, which represents cases of not applying PBA to PBA-suitable
contracts, merits comment. Quadrant IV cases would presumably occur for reasons
related to inadequate agency contracting capacity, such as inadequate training of
personnel to recognize PBA-suitable requirements, or inadequate resources to apply
PBA techniques. Ideally, the number of such “missed opportunities” would be low
and so maintained through attention to agency contracting capacity. Agency
capability may be enhanced through normative isopraxist influences such as
training and education, as discussed earlier. As suggested in Fig. 9.2, however, the
past PBA policy push had effect of diverting attention away from Quadrant IV cases
and toward blanket application of PBA, regardless of agency capacity or other
influences.
Fig. 9.2 The policy push toward application
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Narrowing the PBA Policy-Practice GAP
Consider the revised PBA policy push in Fig. 9.3. Here policy-makers’ emphasis is
on PBA suitability, specifically, on maximizing the number of PBA-suitable
requirements. Considering our prior discussion, this seems proper for at least two
reasons: first, only PBA-suitable contracts can actually yield PBA’s benefits; and
second, this push avoids the costs and wastes of ritual PBA compliance.
Past PBA policy emphasized application over suitability, which had the effect of
discounting practitioner expertise in favor of what amounted to a numbers game
with the objective of maximizing PBA awards. A new PBA policy emphasizing
suitability would place a premium on practitioner involvement in terms of pro-
fessional expertise and judgment as to whether a particular action was suitable for
PBA or, perhaps more importantly, whether an action could be made to be
PBA-suitable. Achievement of PBA-related reform would thus lie substantially in
the realm of agency practice. Significant re-structuring of public procurement
requirements toward wider PBA suitability would arguably represent more sub-
stantive reform than mere increases in numbers of PBA contract awards.
This suggests that policy-makers’ desires for meaningful acquisition reform
might be achieved by reducing reliance on coercive policies. With less coercive
influence from higher, agencies might look to a greater degree to the private sector
for best practices to model. They may be open to a greater extent to cultivating
practitioner judgment and expertise through normative influences from the private
sector via training and educational opportunities, as well as other professional
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Fig. 9.3 The policy push toward suitability
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Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have described the PBA policy-practice gap in terms of various
institutional influences that drive organizational actions in response. The coercive
influences from policy-making entities which emphasize goals, reporting, and
high-level approvals have driven procurement practitioners to respond with ritual
compliance, which jeopardizes the full realization of PBA’s benefits in federal
acquisition. Narrowing this gap between policy and practice, according to institu-
tional theory, will require policy-makers to take a less coercive approach and
promote instead polices that open agencies to mimetic and normative influences
from the private sector.
In closing, we note two recent developments that may suggest movement in this
new direction. First, in March 2015, the Navy removed the higher-level approval
requirement by designating the contracting officer as the approval authority for
non-PBA actions. Second, executive educational programs on performance-based
logistics (PBL, the manifestation of PBA in the context of logistics support) have
been established at the University of Tennessee.5 These programs are open to
attendees from both the public and private sectors and use teaching materials that
are developed from PBL cases in both sectors. Additionally, an international
textbook on PBL has recently been published (Essig and Glas 2014). This suggests
the presence of mimetic and normative influences in the PBL arena. Whether this
relaxing of coercive influence in the Navy and the emergence of mimetic and
normative influences in PBL will affect the current configuration of institutional
isopraxisms remains to be seen.
Fig. 9.4 PBA institutional isopraxisms to narrow the policy-practice gap
5See http://globalsupplychainemba.utk.edu/exec-programs/strategy-relationships/pbl.asp.
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